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When the Home Team Calls Their Own Balls and 
Strikes: The Problem of Brady Violations, 
Accountability, and Making the Case for a 




“The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the 
courts.” Frederick William Lehmann, 13th Solicitor General of the United 
States1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Brady Problem 
In 1984, the daughter of Clyde Ray Spencer, a police officer in 
Washington state, allegedly accused him of molesting her.2 After an 
investigation, Spencer was charged with molesting his daughter and two 
other children.3 Spencer entered an Alford plea4 after learning that his 
 
* J.D., Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to thank the SJSJ team 
for extremely helpful feedback and edits; Andrea D. Lyon, who first inspired the author’s 
interest in Brady; Michael Russo, who assisted with the author’s inquiry into possible 
solutions; and Frederick F. Cohn, who first inspired the author’s love of the law. 
1 This quote is attributed, but not specifically cite sourced, to Frederick William 
Lehmann, 13th solicitor general under President Taft. The inscription decks the panels at 
the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. and is quoted within the Brady v. 
Maryland opinion, there attributed to a paraphrase delivered by Judge Simon E. Sobeloff. 
Rafael Alberto Madan, The Sign and Seal of Justice, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 194–96 
(2008); see also infra note 58. 
2 See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2020), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3657 
[https://perma.cc/YVA9-3UHY] [hereinafter SPENCER MISCONDUCT]. 
3 Id. 
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defense counsel had not prepared to defend his case.5 After serving ten 
years of his sentence in prison, Spencer hired a new attorney who 
determined that Brady violations had occurred during the lead up to his 
initial trial.6 Spencer was later informed that during the first trial, the State 
withheld the results of medical exams that demonstrated no physical abuse 
had occurred.7 The prosecutor also withheld the fact that Spencer’s wife 
was having an affair with the police detective who was supervising the 
investigation.8 During the course of discovery, none of these facts were 
disclosed to the defense.9 Furthermore, two of the three children eventually 
recanted their testimony, claiming they had been coerced into making 
statements against Spencer.10 In 2009, Spencer’s plea was vacated, based on 
the Brady violations and recantations by his children.11 One year later, he 
withdrew his plea and prosecutors dropped the charges against him.12 The 
details illuminated in the aftermath of Spencer’s trial demonstrated 
suppression of evidence13 that would have been favorable to Spencer14 and 
that would have been material to his case.15 This is often what a Brady 
violation looks like. 
With no systematic, successful accountability mechanisms in place, 
many prosecutors are deeply entrenched in the practice of withholding 
 
4 Id.; see also Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants 
Should Avoid the Alford Plea, 68 MO. L. REV. 913 (2003). An Alford plea allows a 
defendant to plead guilty while contemporaneously asserting their own innocence. 








13 Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline 
Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
881, 895 (2015). 
14 SPENCER MISCONDUCT, supra note 2. 
15 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13. 
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exculpatory evidence from criminal defendants during the course of 
criminal proceedings.16 This practice, known as a Brady violation, can 
occur whether a prosecutor withholds evidence knowingly or 
unknowingly.17 Prosecutors who commit Brady violations reinforce a 
culture that places more emphasis on convicting any person than convicting 
the right person.18 This behavior, and the culture that propagates it, creates 
myriad negative impacts, including wrongful convictions, traumatization 
for victims and victims’ families, and high costs for taxpayers.19 
Most prosecutors who commit Brady violations are shielded from 
accountability due to the absolute immunity afforded to them20 and the gaps 
in accountability left by current corrective structures.21 To decrease Brady 
violations and their resulting wrongful convictions, Washington state 
should influence prosecutorial conduct by teaching students and new 
prosecutors methods for meeting Brady obligations and by passing 
legislation to enact a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. 
When law students are afforded experiential and clinical experiences, 
they are better able to develop professional judgment that prepares them for 
their legal careers.22 When prosecutors experience an “ethical 
 
16 Id. at 914. 
17 Although guidance for a Brady violation resulted from the Brady case, several 
subsequent cases have finessed how the rule in Brady is applied. See Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995); see infra 
Section II. 
18 Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 412 (2011). The author discusses case load 
pressure as a motivation for prosecutorial strategy: “It is also true that many prosecutors 
carry staggering caseloads, creating pressure to dispose of cases in an assembly line 
fashion that can result in oversights or omissions that later lead to allegations of 
misconduct.” 
19 Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute 
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 515–16 (2011). 
20 Id. at 526. 
21 Id. at 511; see also infra Sections II, III, IV. 
22 Bazelon, supra note 18, at 407. 
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atmosphere”23 in their workplace, it is more likely they will choose to act 
ethically.24 If the proposed legislation and resulting Commission are 
enacted, the shield of immunity and the culture that has normalized Brady 
violations will be disrupted. These efforts will foster positive outcomes 
related to judicial efficiency, ethical conduct for attorneys, a reduction in 
wrongful convictions, and a reduction in trauma for crime victims and 
family members of individuals that are wrongfully convicted.25 
B. Roadmap 
Section II of this article provides a brief history of prosecutorial 
immunity, which sets the backdrop for exploring why and how Brady 
violations proliferate. Section III introduces Brady violations and the 
evolution of case law, explores what the Brady rule was likely intended to 
accomplish, and highlights where it has fallen short of protecting criminal 
defendants’ constitutional rights. Section IV discusses prosecutorial 
accountability mechanisms and offers a critique for why current structures 
neither adequately curb Brady violations nor adequately hold prosecutors 
accountable. Section V proposes solutions, including training opportunities 
at the law school and municipal levels and a Washington State Commission 
on Prosecutorial Conduct. Section VI addresses possible criticisms and 
responds to those criticisms. 
II. ROOTS OF PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY 
Prosecutors are granted absolute immunity from civil damages in 
lawsuits based upon their conduct when the conduct was undertaken in 
pursuance of their prosecutorial functions.26 While this immunity is rooted 
in common law, it was solidified by the Supreme Court in Imbler v. 
 
23 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 926. 
24 Id. 
25 Infra note 181. 
26 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 923. 
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Pachtman in 1976: “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based 
upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of 
judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.”27 
The roots of the protection offered to prosecutors date back more than 
one hundred years.28 In 1871, the post-Civil War Congress enacted United 
States Code 42 U.S.C. § 1983, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.29 The 
Act was passed with the intent to prevent unjust prosecutions of federal 
officials who were assisting newly freed slaves with civil rights claims.30 
These officials were often victim to malicious prosecution in states that 
opposed Reconstruction efforts.31 At its inception, drafters of § 1983 
intended to use the federal statute to hold prosecutors civilly liable for 
malicious prosecution. In essence, Congress enacted § 1983 during 
Reconstruction to help enforce compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment 
and protect officials from frivolous tort actions at the hands of Anti-
Reconstruction prosecutors.32 
 
27 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976). 
28 Johns, supra note 19, at 524. 
29 At time of original statute, it read, in part: 
An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes. 
Be it enacted… That any person who, under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to 
be subjected any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom 
or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party 
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit 
courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, 
review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, 
under the provisions of the [Civil Rights Act of 1866], and the other remedial 
laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases. 
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
30 Johns, supra note 19, at 510. 
31 Id. at 526. 
32 David Keenan, Deborah Jane Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, Myth of 
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional 
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While § 1983 protected various categories of federal officials, 
prosecutors were not specifically protected as a class until twenty-five years 
after the statute was first adopted.33 In 1896, the Supreme Court of Indiana 
held in Griffith v. Slinkard that, despite known malice committed by the 
prosecution, the action should be dismissed based on absolute prosecutorial 
immunity.34 Griffith v. Slinkard granted total exemption to the prosecutor, 
disregarding the alleged motivation behind the conduct.35 In Griffith, the 
prosecutor maliciously indicted a defendant even though the grand jury had 
found no evidence or probable cause.36 The court found the prosecutor’s 
actions to be undertaken as a judicial officer, although not as a judge of a 
court.37 Further, the Griffith court quoted a prominent treatise from the 
time: 
Whenever duties of a judicial nature are imposed upon a public 
officer, the due execution of which depends upon his own 
judgment, he is exempt from all responsibility by action for the 
motives which influence him and the manner in which said duties 
are performed. If corrupt, he may be impeached or indicted; but he 
cannot be prosecuted by an individual to obtain redress for the 
wrong which may have been done. No public officer is responsible 
in a civil suit for a judicial determination, however erroneous it 
may be, and however malicious the motive which produced it.38 
Over time, Griffith grew to become the majority rule on the issue,39 and 
nearly a century after Griffith, the Court solidified immunity for prosecutors 
 
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE 
L.J. F. 203, 214 (2012). 
33 Johns, supra note 19, at 526. 
34 Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (1896). 
35 Id.; see also Johns, supra note 19, at 526. 
36 Griffith, 44 N.E. at 1001. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (quoting JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER & 
LIBEL (3d Ed.), § 227, pp. 395–396.) 
39 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976). 
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in Imbler.40 Paul Imbler spent years in the California courts appealing a 
death sentence for a murder he did not commit.41 After ten years of 
litigation, Imbler was a free man, which set the stage for his civil suit 
against the prosecutor in his case, among other governmental officials.42 
Even though Imbler’s conviction was vacated on the basis of egregious 
state misconduct,43 his resulting civil suit did not provide him with relief.44 
Instead, the United States Supreme Court summarized their position on 
absolute immunity by quoting Judge Learned Hand: 
As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance 
between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it 
has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs 
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their 
duty to the constant dread of retaliation.45 
The Supreme Court’s analysis was based on the premise that common law 
immunity was “well settled.”46 The Court went on to ask the question of 
“whether the same considerations of public policy that underlie the 
common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity under § 1983.”47 
They held that it did.48 The progression demonstrates how a common law 
misnomer was invoked and clung to by the judiciary as a whole in order to 
make absolute immunity for prosecutors a majority rule.49 
The trajectory of the federal statute demonstrates that its original intent 
was flipped on its head as § 1983 was first adopted in 1871 to protect 
officials who were helping to ensure that individual civil rights were 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 415. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 431. 
45 Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 424. 
48 Id. 
49 Johns, supra note 19, at 526–7. 
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protected during Reconstruction.50 However, a handful of state courts began 
to interpret this statute as a method to provide absolute immunity to 
prosecutors,51 and this slow divergence in the use of the statute leads us to 
present day. A statute first enacted to protect individuals’ civil rights is now 
being used to provide prosecutors with absolute immunity from civil 
liability.52 Scholar and immunity expert Margaret Johns summarized the 
disingenuous way in which § 1983 evolved: 
[A]nd it certainly did not intend to insulate prosecutors from 
liability for malicious prosecutions, since that was one of the 
tactics of southern defiance to Reconstruction that the Ku Klux 
Klan Act was intended to remedy. To the extent that the doctrine 
of absolute prosecutorial immunity purportedly rests on historical 
understandings, it is insupportable.53 
III. BRADY AND ITS IMPACTS 
A. The Evolution of Brady 
Under the shield of absolute immunity, prosecutors are largely free to 
engage in acts of misconduct, including Brady violations.54 A Brady 
violation occurs when a prosecutor or anyone working in support of the 
State’s case withholds exculpatory evidence from the defense.55 The United 
States Supreme Court summarized this due process violation in 1963.56 The 
Court held in Brady v. Maryland that “suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
 
50 Id. at 510. 
51 Id. at 526. 
52 Id. at 526–7. 
53 Id. 
54 See Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 204. 
55 Jason Kreag, Disclosing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 72 VAND. L. REV. 297, 305–06 
(2019). 
56 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”57 Further, the Court in Brady 
contextualized the need for justice: 
A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused 
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce 
the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. 
That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding 
that does not comport with standards of justice . . .58 
The key elements of the resulting rule are suppression, favorability, and 
materiality.59 A Brady violation occurs if the prosecution suppresses 
evidence that is deemed favorable to the defense, and that evidence is 
relevant and significant to the facts of the case.60 While most practitioners 
in, and scholars of, the legal profession are well versed in the term “Brady 
violation,” the scope of obligations laid out in Brady has been distinctly 
nuanced by at least three additional United States Supreme Court cases: 
United States v. Agurs, United States v. Bagley, and Kyles v. Whitley.61 
Each of these cases articulates how Brady places decision-making about the 
rules in the hands of prosecutors—the very cadre of attorneys for whom the 
rules were created.62 
In 1976, the Court in United States v. Agurs held that a Brady violation is 
implicated when undisclosed evidence demonstrates perjured testimony that 
 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 87–88. Within this eloquent part of the opinion, the Brady court quoted 
Frederick William Lehmann, who was appointed solicitor general by President Taft in 
1910. See also Jeremy L. Carlson, The Professional Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose 
Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense: Implications of Rule 3.8(D) of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 28 J. LEGAL PRO. 125, 126 (2004); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF 
SOLIC. GEN., SOLIC. GEN. FREDERICK WILLIAM LEHMANN (2019) 
https://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/frederick-w-lehmann [https://perma.cc/KHC2-6VH9]. 
59 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914. 
60 Id. 
61 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 
(1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); see also Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 
207. 
62 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914. 
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the prosecutor knew about, or should have known about.63 In 1985, the 
Court in United States v. Bagley held that “evidence at issue is material 
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”64 In 1995, the Court in Kyles v. Whitley held the following: 
[The] individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in 
the case, including the police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds 
or fails in meeting this obligation… the prosecution’s 
responsibility for failing to disclose known, favorable evidence 
rising to a material level of importance is inescapable.65 
From 1963 to 1995, an evolution occurred from Brady, where the Court 
required that a defendant make a request for evidence, to Kyles, where the 
Court placed responsibility on the prosecution to disclose known, favorable 
evidence.66 In Agurs and Bagley, the Court set standards for perjured 
evidence and materiality.67 While these subsequent cases helped clarify 
prosecutors’ Brady obligations, many prosecutors still knowingly and 
unknowingly conduct themselves in ways that violate Brady.68 
Scholars and defense attorneys critique the elements of Brady for leaving 
too much decision-making power in the hands of prosecutors.69 For 
example, the materiality element articulated by Bagley places decision-
making about possible case outcomes in the hands of the prosecutor.70 On 
its surface, this evaluation sounds similar to the harmless error doctrine: 
 
63 427 U.S. at 103; see also Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 208. 
64 473 U.S. at 668; see also Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 886. 
65 514 U.S. at 437–38. 
66 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437–38. 
67 See 427 U.S. at 104; 473 U.S. at 680. 
68 See Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 209–11. 
69 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914. 
70 SAMUEL R. GROSS, MAURICE J. POSSLEY, KAITLIN JACKSON ROLL & KLARA HUBER 
STEPHENS, GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT AND CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: THE ROLE 
OF PROSECUTORS, POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT 76 (2020), 
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[a] judgment that sometimes a constitutional violation does not 
require reversal of a conviction because the outcome of the case 
would have been the same without the violation. But it’s not. If the 
evidence is “immaterial” there is no obligation to disclose it; 
failure to do so is not a forgivable violation of the constitution rule 
but, no violation at all.71 
The inquiry into harmless error requires a judge to determine whether there 
was an error, and whether the error was harmless .72 Within a Brady inquiry, 
however, instead of a judge making that determination, the prosecutor 
makes the determination during the course of pre-trial and trial 
proceedings.73 
Similarly, the issue of favorability requires that prosecutors make value 
judgements on whether a particular piece of evidence would be considered 
valuable to the defense.74 Maurice Possley, a journalist with prosecutorial 
expertise, and Thomas Sullivan, who has practiced law for more than sixty 
years, made a particularly keen analogy that illustrates the problematic 
discretion afforded to prosecutors:75 “Imagine a professional sporting event 
in which one of the contestants is permitted to make the close calls—
whether it was a ball or strike, whether the tennis ball was in or out, 
whether the tackle was offside, etc.—without oversight by an independent 
umpire.”76 The prosecutors charged with making tough calls on the use of 
evidence are often torn between two divergent goals: a passionate 
representation of the United States government and its people and a strong 
desire to actualize a criminal conviction only when appropriate.77 
 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Government_Misconduct_an





74 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914. 
75 Id. at 914–15. 
76 Id. at 915 n.131. 
77 Id. 
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Nonetheless, they call their own balls and strikes, often times prioritizing a 
win over engaging fairly with the system. 
A prosecutor cannot know every investigative puzzle piece that a defense 
attorney may have cultivated,78 leaving them guessing as to whether 
something should be considered favorable or not. Defense attorneys are 
much better poised to determine what evidence will best support their 
client.79 Practicing attorneys also critique the element of materiality for 
being subjective, at least at the stage that informs prosecutors’ decisions 
related to disclosure of evidence.80 Although materiality is considered an 
“after the fact” test”81 because it is evaluated at the appellate stage, defense 
attorneys and scholars argue that prosecutors who feel they have a strong 
case will ignore disclosure, feeling confident that non-disclosed evidence 
would not impact the outcome of the case anyway.82 These considerations 
can lead prosecutors to feel that their Brady obligations can be ignored. As 
one Brady scholar, Alafair Burke, stated: 
Much of the blame for Brady’s failure to protect the innocent has 
been laid at the doors of the prosecutors charged with the 
doctrine’s effectuation . . . Brady has become a “paper tiger,” 
frequently and blatantly disregarded by prosecutors who have 
come to realize that they can suppress exculpatory evidence with 




80 Id. at 917. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 916. 
83 Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 482 (2009). 
Although a full critique of Brady elements is outside the scope of this article, it is 
contextually important to share Burke’s harsh critique of the materiality element: 
Although the word “material” might at first blush seem so immaterial in the 
original Brady opinion, surrounded as it was by such sweeping and ambitious 
rhetoric, that single word has since proven a significant restriction on a 
prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. Brady’s 
progeny have made clear that prosecutors are not constitutionally obligated to 
disclose all exculpatory evidence, or even all relevant exculpatory evidence. In 
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In Brady, the Supreme Court dictated that when prosecutors withhold 
exculpatory evidence, justice is not served.84 The Court further tailored the 
rules in subsequent cases,85 but prosecutors still have broad discretion86 and 
are often challenged to act within the confines of competing values: 
pursuing a conviction and appropriate outcomes for a criminal defendant 
for whom they hold deep beliefs regarding guilt while evaluating ethical 
considerations and less tangible notions regarding “fair play.”87 
B. Brady’s Impacts 
Prosecutors’ disregard for Brady results in myriad negative impacts that 
are felt by wrongfully convicted individuals, crime victims, their families, 
and taxpayers.88 Wrongful convictions ruin the lives of the innocent 
individuals, many of whom will never regain their freedom.89 Rather, they 
are taken from their families and experience detrimental effects on their 
physical and mental health.90 Additionally, wrongful convictions allow 
individuals who actually commit crimes to remain free, causing safety risks 
to communities and society as a whole.91 When the wrong individual sits in 
prison, the actual perpetrator of a crime is free to commit additional 
 
fact, the definition of “material” exculpatory evidence is so restrictive that it is 
probably best articulated not as a duty of the prosecutor to disclose, but as a 
narrow exception to a prosecutor’s general right to withhold evidence from the 
defense. Under Brady’s progeny, a prosecutor can constitutionally withhold all 
evidence, except for exculpatory evidence that “creates a reasonable doubt that 
did not otherwise exist.” 
84 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
85 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 
(1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); see also Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 
207. 
86 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914. 
87 Bazelon, supra note 18, at 411. 
88 See Johns, supra note 19, at 514–15. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 515. 
91 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 884 n.5. 
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crimes.92 This injustice creates substantial negative impacts for victims and 
victims’ families, in particular those who begin to understand that the 
person who sits in prison is not the person who harmed them or their loved 
one.93 
There are also high taxpayer costs incurred when a person is wrongfully 
convicted.94 The courts must administer a trial (and often multiple resulting 
appellate proceedings) for an innocent person.95 Offices of prosecution and 
public defense incur costs during these proceedings.96 Wrongful convictions 
incur incarceration costs.97 Federally, the cost for incarcerating one inmate 
in fiscal year 2018 was between approximately $34,000 and $38,000, 
depending on the facility.98 In Washington state, the cost for incarceration 
in fiscal year 2018, per inmate, ranged from $32,000 to $40,000, depending 
on the facility.99 Current taxpayers are paying court and prison costs for 
individuals who do not belong there.100 Because statistics about wrongful 
convictions are generally lacking,101 it is difficult to create a savings 
formula based on these annual averages. The lack of data also limits how 
states can respond to Brady violations.102 
It is difficult to find specific data on Brady violations nationally or at the 
statewide level.103 There is no state registry or data collection currently 
 
92 Johns, supra note 19, at 516. 
93 Id. at 515. 
94 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 884. 
95 Id. 
96 Johns, supra note 19, at 516. 
97 Id. 
98 NAT’L ARCHIVES, FED. REG., ANN. DETERMINATION OF AVERAGE COST OF 
INCARCERATION FEE (COIF) (2019), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/11/19/2019-24942/annual-
determination-of-average-cost-of-incarceration-fee-coif [https://perma.cc/RS3J-V883] 
[hereinafter INCARCERATION FEE]. 
99 Id. 
100 Johns, supra note 19, at 515–16. 
101 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 239. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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available.104 Prosecutors are not named in appellate opinions that involve 
Brady violations105 and because there is very little accountability by way of 
professional standards mechanisms, the organizations that manage those 
professional standards are not a good data source for tracking known 
violations.106 
However, the National Registry of Exonerations provides data on 
exonerations that can be filtered by multiple factors, including by state.107 
Official misconduct, which can and does include Brady violations, is one of 
the elements relayed in the data. For example, since 1989, the National 
Registry of Exonerations has documented fifty-two exonerations in 
Washington state.108 The Registry provides that twenty of those 
exonerations (nearly 40%) involved official misconduct.109 At the time of 
writing, the data does not specifically call out Brady violations, but these 
violations would be classified as official misconduct.110 Further research is 
needed in order to claim, with confidence, a percentage of Washington 
state’s exonerations that are due in part or in whole to a Brady violation.111 
The lack of empirical data is a real barrier in effectuating productive Brady 
accountability, because like any social problem, identification of the issue is 
a first-step to solving the problem. 
 
104 Id. 
105 Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2008). 
106 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 213; see also Johns, supra note 19, at 520. 
107 See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, INTERACTIVE DATA DISPLAY (2019), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-





176 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
IV. BRADY ACCOUNTABILITY (OR LACK THEREOF) 
The issue of accountability for prosecutorial misconduct in the legal 
profession is multifaceted. This section will explore five specific flaws 
within our criminal justice system: (1) the weakness of appellate processes 
as accountability mechanisms; 112 (2) the near limitless civil protections that 
§ 1983 provides to prosecutors;113 (3) the inexistence of criminal 
prosecutions against prosecutors who violate Brady; 114 (4) the lack of 
enforcement of professional conduct within both state and federal 
government; 115 and (5) the lack of both state and federal legislation to 
enforce Brady accountability.116 
In appellate processes, courts will only overturn and/or vacate on a Brady 
violation if the appellant can meet a very high bar, showing all three 
elements of the rule: suppression, favorability, and materiality.117 While 
suppression and favorability are often easier to prove, the materiality 
requirement demands there be a reasonable probability that the evidence 
would have changed the outcome of the case.118 Further, the bar for proving 
that a prosecutor acted under excessive liability is so high that it 
disincentivizes plaintiffs from filing for an appeal.119 
Judges evaluate Brady violations using the harmless error doctrine. When 
a judge finds that a violation occurred, the violation will only lead to an 
overturned conviction if the appellant can prove that they suffered 
 
112 Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1066. 
113 Johns, supra note 19, at 522. 
114 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 213; see also Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1086; 
Johns, supra note 19, at 520. 
115 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 218. 
116 Dan M. Clark, NY State DAs Move to Block Creation of Prosecutorial Conduct 
Watchdog, N.Y. L.J. (April 1, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/04/01/ny-state-das-move-to-block-
creation-of-prosecutorial-conduct-watchdog/ [https://perma.cc/36WH-75VQ]. 
117 Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1075. 
118 Id.; see also Burke, supra note 83. 
119 Johns, supra note 19, at 522. 
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identifiable prejudice, based on the Brady violation.120 Even when judges 
do discuss Brady violations within appellate opinions, they often times go 
out of their way to avoid identifying prosecutors that are implicated in those 
violations.121 Some appellate judges may believe that when they reverse a 
case based on misconduct, they are finding fault of a prosecutor for the first 
time.122 It is possible that an appellate judge believes they are acting out of 
compassion, believing that the reversal itself will admonish the prosecutor’s 
bad behavior.123 
Yet this very practice offers intentional or unintentional shield to those 
with serial misbehavior.124 For example, the Florida Supreme Court and 
California Supreme Court both heard cases in the late 1990s with findings 
of serious prosecutorial misconduct. In both sets of circumstances, lower 
courts had already admonished bad behavior when authoring appellate 
decisions, but always with the overt decision to use “Assistant United States 
Attorney” (or AUSA) in their written decisions instead of personally 
naming the prosecutorial offender.125 In California, the prosecutor engaged 
in misconduct during a death penalty case many years after she was first 
admonished (but never by name within appellate decisions).126 The 
California Supreme Court only became aware of the two prior admonishing 
decisions because of research conducted and submitted by the appellant’s 
 
120 Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1066. 
121 Id. at 1068. In discussing a specific case to illustrate this problem, the author notes: 
Despite… egregious misconduct, the Court never identified the prosecutors 
involved. Instead, in the introduction and factual history section of its opinion, 
the Court referred forty-two times to “the State” and “the prosecutors.” In 
many of these instances and other references throughout the body of the 
opinion, it would have made more sense grammatically to use the prosecutors’ 
actual names. 
122 Id. at 1071. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1071–74. 
126 Id. at 1074. 
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attorneys.127 In both the California and the Florida examples, the 
prosecutors resigned, which prevented future misconduct from occurring.128 
While these examples are by no means standalone,129 it is more rare than 
not for prosecutors to be named in appellate decisions.130 Thus, even when 
an appellant overcomes Brady, it is not likely that the prosecutor who 
committed the violation is held accountable by way of the appellate 
process.131 
Accountability by way of civil suit also proves a difficult endeavor, in 
part by creating confusion and relying on common law misnomers.132 
Although § 1983 itself did not promise immunity when first enacted in 
1871, states and the courts have worked progressively over time to interpret 
it as such.133 As highlighted in Section II, the concept of personal tort 
liability under § 1983 has been rejected by the United States Supreme 
Court.134 Municipal tort liability (civil liability imposed upon the 
municipality) was sometimes used with success for plaintiffs135 until 2011, 
when the United States Supreme Court held in Connick v. Thompson that 
“plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 
must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused their 
injury.”136 Justice Ruther Bader Ginsberg dissented in the case: 
[a] district attorney’s deliberate indifference might be shown in 
several ways… [District Attorney] Connick created a tinderbox in 
Orleans Parish in which Brady violations were nigh inevitable. 
And when they did occur, Connick insisted there was no need to 







132 Johns, supra note 19, at 510–11. 
133 Id. at 522. 
134 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 213. 
135 Id. 
136 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). 
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accountable on the ground that doing so would make his job more 
difficult.137 
As discussed in Section II, personal tort liability has long been a dead end 
for achieving justice and accountability, and with Connick, municipal tort 
liability has joined that path, leaving one fewer mechanism for 
accountability.138 
The United States Supreme Court offered criminal proceedings against a 
prosecutor as a possible remedy in 1976 when it reinforced absolute 
immunity in Imbler,139 but it failed to cite even one occurrence where 
criminal proceedings had been successfully pursued.140 Prosecutors are 
rarely, if ever, held accountable by way of criminal proceedings.141 In 
Section III, the relaxed enforcement of prosecutorial discretion was 
analogized to a sporting event, where one team’s own members would be 
expected or required to take action that is in direct opposition to their ability 
to win the game.142 Similarly, if criminal proceedings were to be initiated 
for prosecutors, other attorneys—often times their own colleagues—would 
be required to take the first step by filing charges.143 Although the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires 
that an attorney report behavior of another attorney,144 one study of 1,000 
Boston attorneys found that less than 7% of those surveyed would report on 
a colleague who had engaged in flagrant behavior.145 If attorneys will not 
come forward to ethics boards, it is unrealistic to believe that they would 
actually file charges against their colleagues in a court of law. 
 
137 Id. at 108. 
138 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 213. 
139 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
140 Johns, supra note 19, at 520. 
141 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 213; see also Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1086; 
Johns, supra note 19, at 520. 
142 Sullivan & Possley, supra note 13, at 914. 
143 Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1086. 
144 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
145 Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1086. 
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Prosecutions of prosecutors for misconduct are nearly nonexistent.146 At 
the federal level, prosecutors can be criminally prosecuted for violating 
constitutional protections under 18 U.S.C. § 242.147 However, this avenue 
proves more theoretical than practical, and it is rarely used.148 At the state 
level, it is difficult to know how many prosecutors have faced criminal 
liability for misconduct.149 A comprehensive report put out by the National 
Registry of Exonerations cites only two known prosecutions.150 In both of 
these cases, the prosecutors who became the defendants received nominal 
sentences.151 First, in 2007, Michael Nifong, the former District Attorney of 
Durham County, North Carolina, was convicted of criminal contempt for 
concealing exculpatory evidence in a prosecution of three members of the 
Duke University Lacrosse team who were falsely accused of rape.152 Nifong 
 
146 GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT, supra note 70, at 102. 
147 Johns, supra note 19, at 520. The code, titled Deprivation of Rights Under Color of 
Law, reads: 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, 
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, 
Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such 
person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for 
the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts 
committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death 
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts 
include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an 
attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined 
under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may 
be sentenced to death. 
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996). 
148 Johns, supra note 19, at 520. 
149 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 218. 
150 GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT, supra note 70, at 102. 
151 Id. at 120. 
152 Id. 
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spent one day in jail.153 The attention this case received resulted in an 
additional exoneration for someone previously tried by Nifong in 1991.154 
Next, in 2013, former Williamson County, Texas District Attorney, Ken 
Anderson, was convicted of contempt after concealing exculpatory 
evidence that would have prevented a wrongful conviction for a man who 
spent twenty-four years in prison before his exoneration.155 Although 
prosecutors Nifong and Anderson spent only five days in jail between them, 
they were both eventually disbarred and lost their jobs.156 To date, the 
National Registry of Exonerations names these two as “the only two 
American prosecutors who have ever been convicted of criminal contempt 
for lying in court.”157 
The number of criminal prosecutions for prosecutors is likely so low due 
to a societal perception that criminal liability is too harsh for someone who 
made a technical error in the course of their demanding and stressful 
work.158 The legal community may prefer alternate avenues of 
accountability, reserving criminal proceedings for those practice errors 
considered most egregious.159 Within this current environment, the 
prosecutor may make a technical error and cause an innocent person to lose 
their freedom, but never be judged under the same criminal justice system. 
If this is the accepted norm, it should give us pause. With civil liability and 
criminal proceedings largely unavailable, few avenues remain to provide 
justice and accountability for those whose constitutional rights have been 
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As mentioned above, professional responsibility measures are highly 
underutilized and largely ineffective.160 Ethical obligations of prosecutors 
are outlined in the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule for 
Professional Conduct 3.8,161 also adopted in Washington state.162 
Washington State Rule for Professional Conduct 3.8(d) provides guidance 
specific to prosecutors about disclosure of favorable evidence: 
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt 
of the accused or mitigates the offense and, in connection with 
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all 
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the 
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of 
the tribunal . . .163 
Rule 3.8 is the only rule that guides ethical duties specific to 
prosecutors,164 and the rule is unique in that the majority of model rules do 
not distinguish between private and public attorneys.165 The rule provides 
more strict parameters than Brady initially obligated.166 It requires known 
favorable evidence to be disclosed in a timely manner, regardless of a 
defendant’s request.167 This is a positive step that should help deter Brady 
violations. 
Yet a rule is only effective when enforced.168 Yale scholars identified 
multiple breakdowns in professional responsibility measures .169 The 
 
160 Id. at 213. 
161 Id. at 221. 
162 WASH. ST. CT. R.P.C. 3.8. 
163 Id. 
164 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 222. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 224. 
167 Id. 
168 Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, It’s Hard to Be a Human Being and a Lawyer: 
Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. 
VA. L. REV. 495, 502 (2003). The authors offer examples of professional development 
organizations using ethics guidelines as a mechanism not for enforcement, but as a 
“smoke screen” to offer appearances of accountability in what can be deemed self-
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findings included a failure for ethical rules to define prosecutorial 
misconduct (arguing a weakness of Rule 3.8 highlighted above), a lack of 
appropriate rights for complainants, an overbroad discretion of 
administrators making decisions, reporting failures among those who have 
knowledge of misconduct, and confusion about disciplinary authorities, 
based on overlapping policy avenues.170 A troubling illustration of 
unsanctioned complaints is present in the Washington state data. For 
example, the most recent ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline System results 
from 2017171 demonstrates that less than 5% of complaints filed with the 
ABA in Washington state resulted in sanctions for attorneys.172 This figure 
includes all complaints of misconduct, not just those regarding alleged 
Brady violations.173 In Washington state the decision-making boards are 
mostly populated by attorneys.174 In 2017, only 29% of the board members 
were non-attorneys,175 leaving little outside attention and guidance towards 
this accountability mechanism. As discussed above, attorneys are not likely 
to report the unethical or illegal behavior of their own colleagues, and 
therefore, the majority-attorney composition of these state boards is 
problematic. 
There is no federally mandated accountability mechanism in place that 
systematically and specifically addresses Brady violations and other forms 
of prosecutorial misconduct.176 Individual states are also lacking.177 The 
 
monitored professions. Statistics derived from the ABA (see, e.g. infra note 171) validate 
this assertion as far as Washington State is concerned. 
169 Keenan et al., supra note 32, at 221. 
170 Id. 
171 STANDING COMM. ON PRO. REGUL. OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PRO. RESP., 
2017 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2019), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
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172 Id. at chart I pt.A, chart III pt.A, chart III pt.B. 
173 Id. at chart I pt.A. 
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state of New York recently passed legislation to institute a commission on 
prosecutorial conduct, the first state to do so.178 This legislation is currently 
ensnared in legal challenges from district attorneys in that state, discussed 
in Section V below.179 
As demonstrated above, each possible avenue to provide accountability 
for Brady violations proves problematic. Appellate, civil, criminal, 
professional conduct, federal, and state mechanisms each lack strong hooks 
for prosecutors, or provide such hooks with nearly no realistic enforcement. 
This leaves prosecutors free to engage in behaviors they undertake under 
the guise of “passionately” enforcing justice,180 while innocent, wrongfully 
convicted members of society continue to suffer injustices. 
V. CREATING THE WASHINGTON STATE COMMISSION ON 
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT 
To decrease Brady violations and their resulting wrongful convictions, 
Washington state should draft and pass legislation to create a Commission 
on Prosecutorial Conduct. The Commission can help deter prosecutorial 
misconduct, including Brady violations, in three ways: (1) the Commission 
should process, track, evaluate, and offer findings on complaints of 
prosecutorial misconduct, including Brady violations; (2) the Commission 
should build a professional development program, which can work with 
each county prosecuting attorney’s office to offer training specific to 
prosecutorial conduct and Brady violations; and (3) the Commission should 
partner with the three law schools in Washington state to offer curricular 
content and co-curricular training on the topic of prosecutorial ethics and 
Brady violations. Through accountability, training, and teaching, the 
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct will reduce Brady violations and 
 
177 See Clark, supra note 116. 
178 S.B. 2412D, 2017–2018 Leg., 202nd Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
179 Clark, supra note 116. 
180 See Gershowitz, supra note 105, at 1065. 
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provide a mechanism for correcting the harm felt in the wake of their 
occurrence.181 
A. Building the Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct 
In order for the Washington State Legislature to create realistic 
legislation that can be passed, members of the Legislature should scan the 
environment and research benefits and challenges of current models. 
Legislators can address federal immunity guidelines182 and learn from New 
York’s passed legislation and its forthcoming Commission.183 They can also 
learn from Washington state’s own Commission on Judicial Conduct,184 as 
well as King County’s Brady Committee.185 Once legislators have drafted 
measures that will ensure accountability for Brady violations and other 
 
181 To the author’s knowledge, there is no empirical evidence, specific to Brady 
violations, to support the claim that heightened accountability regarding prosecutorial 
conduct will deter misconduct. This is likely due to a near non-existence of 
accountability mechanisms for prosecutorial conduct. In essence, there cannot be a 
measurement of effectiveness of an action/initiative/mechanism when no such 
action/initiative/mechanism has been implemented or enforced. For a discussion of a 
general need for prosecutorial conduct accountability mechanisms, see, e.g., Sullivan & 
Possley, supra note 13, at 896. See also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does 
Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science; Robert Steinbauer, Robert W. Renn, Robert 
R. Taylor & Phil K. Njoroge, Ethical Leadership and Followers’ Moral Judgment: The 
Role of Followers’ Perceived Accountability and Self-Leadership, 120 J. BUS. ETHICS 
381, 383-84 (2014). 
182 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
183 See Clark, supra note 116. 
184 STATE OF WASH. COMM’N ON JUD. CONDUCT (2019), 
https://www.cjc.state.wa.us/index.php?page=about [https://perma.cc/7LPC-ATCN] 
[hereinafter WA COMMISSION JUD. CONDUCT]. 
185 Email from Dan Clark, Assistant Chief Deputy, Crim. Division, King Cnty. 
Prosecuting Att’y’s Off., to E. Kate Cohn, author (Nov. 7, 2019, 09:15 PST) (on file with 
author). Within this email communication, Mr. Clark provided a copy of King County’s 
Brady Committee Protocol. See KING CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y’S OFF. BRADY COMM. 
PROTOCOL (2015), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/King-
County-Brady-Policy-revised-11-06-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/X867-9LMH] [hereinafter 
KC BRADY PROTOCOL] (Part of the decision to write to Mr. Clark was to validate that 
the version available at this non-profit website was accurate and up to date. The PDF 
provided by Mr. Clark validated this assumption). 
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forms of prosecutorial misconduct, they should also make recommendations 
for how the Commission can collaborate with municipalities and law 
schools to train and teach students and new attorneys on ethics topics. 
1. Addressing Federal Immunity Within the Model 
To start the process of building a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct, 
state legislators should consider the problematic federal parameters 
regarding civil rights violations.186 As discussed in Section II, the current § 
1983 statute, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, was passed in 
an effort to protect public officials, who were working to ensure the rights 
of former slaves, from being swept up into frivolous lawsuits by anti-
Reconstructionist government officials.187 In drafting the bill to enact the 
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct, legislators should work within legal 
parameters to justly interpret the United States Supreme Court’s rulings on 
absolute immunity. Even though it is a federal statute, a critique of § 1983’s 
unsupported historical common law underpinnings188 should guide 
Washington state’s own Commission guidelines. Although Washington 
state is limited by Imbler,189 the Washington State Supreme Court may 
choose how to interpret the rules related to absolute immunity set forth in 
the case. The United States Supreme Court in Imbler clearly indicated that 
when a prosecutor is initiating and presenting the State’s case, the 
prosecutor acts under the shield of absolute immunity.190 Yet, the Court 
reserved on what type of immunity should be extended when the prosecutor 
is acting as an administrator or investigator.191 Many attorneys and scholars 
 
186 See supra Section II. 
187 Johns, supra note 19, at 510. 
188 See supra Section II. 
189 Kate McClelland, “Somebody Help Me Understand This”: The Supreme Court’s 
Interpretation of Prosecutorial Immunity and Liability under § 1983, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1323, 1331 (2012). 
190 Id. 
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criticize the functional test provided in Imbler.192 Washington state may 
choose to interpret the rules that guide § 1983 claims in a manner that 
allows for accountability when, during the course of preparing for and 
presenting a case, a prosecutor engages in a Brady violation.193 It is 
shocking to uncover that the roots of what is now applied as absolute 
immunity for prosecutors actually rests in the bedrock of Reconstruction 
efforts to hold prosecutors civilly liable for malicious prosecution.194 The 
current application completely contradicts the original intent.195 It will be a 
strong “bend in the arc” towards moral justice if jurisdictions and legal 
professionals radically reinterpret § 1983 and use its guidance in a manner 
more closely aligned with its intention at the time of the 1871 Congress.196 
2. New York as a Model 
To date, only New York state has passed legislation regarding a 
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct.197 New York Senate Bill S2412D 
was passed by the New York State Legislature and signed by Governor 
Andrew Cuomo on August 20, 2018.198 According to the bill, the New York 
Commission, when appointed,199 will consist of eleven members appointed 
from the three branches of government (i.e., governor, President of Senate, 
chief judge of court of appeals, among others).200 The Commission will 
have functions of conducting hearings and investigations, oaths, 
affirmations, subpoenas, and other related activities needed to make 
decisions and offer findings.201 The Commission will be able to confer 
 
192 Id. at 1339. 
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immunity202 and will be able to implement recommended penalties.203 
Washington state’s Commission should maintain many of the same 
elements as the New York legislation204 and build off this model’s 
strengths. 
3. Washington State’s Commission on Judicial Conduct 
Another model that legislators can use as an example is Washington 
state’s own Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Commission on Judicial 
Conduct was created by a 1980 voter passed amendment to the state 
constitution.205 Goals of the Commission on Judicial Conduct include the 
following: 
… [to] maintain confidence and integrity in the judicial system; 
provide the public with a fair and reasonable process to address 
judicial misconduct or disability; preserve judicial independence; 
provide public accountability; protect the rights of the public while 
safeguarding the reputations of judges from unfounded 
accusations.206  
The listed goals highlight a balance between a desire for public 
accountability and a protection for judicial reputation.207 Legislators should 
use these goals to inform their work. They should also look to the 
Commission on Judicial Conduct for models of how to manage complaints, 
investigations, and findings.208 
For example, the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct 




204 See Columbia Law School Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity, The New 
York State Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct: What Comes Next? (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.law.columbia.edu/public-integrity/what-comes-next-prosecutorial-conduct-
commission [https://perma.cc/EL52-GX8B]. 
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Commission finds probable cause or reasonable grounds on a complaint.209 
After probable cause on a violation is found, a statement of charges is filed 
as a public record.210 From there, fact-finding hearings and records that 
form the basis of the findings are filed within the hearing record.211 Any 
member of the public may search the Commission’s website to research 
findings of any Washington state judge.212 In a process that likely assuages 
judges’ concerns regarding their own reputations, the Commission must 
first have probable cause of a violation before records are made public.213 
Similarly, before making a public record, the Commission on Prosecutorial 
Conduct should conduct a thorough investigation,214 and only make 
complaints public once probable cause has been established. This approach 
will promote transparency in the process, which will both enhance the 
accountability mechanism and promote public trust in the process. 
The Commission on Judicial Conduct may also serve as a model in 
regard to appointees, which is a top constitutional concern in the 
forthcoming New York Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct.215 In 
Washington state, the Commission on Judicial Conduct is housed within the 
judicial branch,216 yet the Commission takes appointments from both the 
judicial branch and the governor—whose position is in the executive 
branch.217 It appears that the Commission on Judicial Conduct includes 
cross branch appointments that were not determined to violate the 
Washington State Constitution.218 Further, it makes sense for the 
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under the judicial branch. This way, the commission could make findings 
and recommendations and deliver them to the Washington State Supreme 
Court. Like the powers enumerated in regard to licensure and disbarment,219 
the Court is best suited to deliver any findings of the Commission. Looking 
for guidance from the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct 
illustrates that, even if New York state stands as the only current legislated 
model related to prosecutorial conduct,220 other models of accountability 
can inform the legislation drafting process. 
4. King County’s Brady Committee 
An additional model exists within county systems that are working to 
curb Brady violations. For example, Washington state’s King County 
formed a Brady Committee in 2007.221 The committee and its resultant 
Brady protocol was “the first of its kind in the state and was adopted, with 
some changes, by the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys 
(WAPA) soon after.”222 The protocol seeks to ensure the King County 
Prosecuting Attorney’s Office meets its Brady obligations during the 
administration of investigations and criminal proceedings.223 The protocol 
covers reports of officer dishonesty, false witness statements, and crime lab 
dishonesty.224 Further, the protocol provides methods for disclosure of 
Brady material that has been collected by the Brady Committee.225 Since 
the inception of the Committee, the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s 
office has modified the protocol as needed and is, as of 2020, working on 
another revision.226 King County’s Brady Committee may not provide an 
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accountability mechanism in regard to discipline, but it does help track 
known offenders.227 
As discussed in Section II, the naming of Brady offenders is a topic rife 
with controversy, with judges often going out of their way to exclude the 
names of prosecutorial bad actors within appeals.228 King County’s Brady 
Committee does not speak directly to naming prosecutors because its goal is 
to assist prosecutors in proactively meeting their Brady obligations.229 
Nevertheless, it creates a structure that should make future accountability 
mechanisms easier to establish. Further, King County’s Brady Committee, 
in collaboration with the proposed Washington State Commission on 
Prosecutorial Conduct, will be able to guide training and teaching 
components, helping to shift the culture regarding disclosure of 
information. This collaboration will positively benefit both prosecutors and 
individuals facing criminal convictions. 
B. Professional Development and Teaching 
The ultimate goal of the Washington State Commission on Prosecutorial 
Conduct will be to provide an accountability mechanism for prosecutorial 
misconduct. The Commission’s function in this regard will be reactive and 
responsive to complaints received. In addition, the Commission has a 
unique opportunity to provide proactive support for new attorneys within 
county and municipal settings. Law students would benefit from being 
trained and taught prosecutorial ethics and the complexities involved in 
Brady obligations and violations. This proactive approach will assist in 
preventing new prosecutors from committing violations. Early training is 
woefully missing from teaching and new professional environments.230 
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The current landscape of ethics education in law schools is critiqued as 
being underdeveloped.231 A study published in the early 1990s stated that 
less than 2% of the pages of law school casebooks consisted of ethics based 
content or discussion.232 Further, some critics offer that the teaching of 
ethics has been cordoned off to one Professional Responsibility course.233 
Professional Responsibility is often taught in such a formal manner that true 
ethical quandaries are not introduced for discussion.234 
Law schools should spend more time in the classroom discussing ethics 
within the legal profession and specifically address Brady violations. These 
discussions can be delivered through the curriculum, in courses covering 
Evidence, Professional Responsibility, and Trial Advocacy, to name a few. 
Outside the classroom, students interested in becoming prosecutors should 
host trainings on how to meet Brady obligations and avoid engaging in 
Brady violations. Students interested in criminal defense should host 
trainings on how to be aware of pitfalls within Brady obligations; how to 
recognize signs of possible Brady violations; and how to seek exculpatory 
evidence from the prosecution (requests, motions, investigation, and 
interpersonal communications with the other side). Education both in and 
out of the classroom will better prepare new attorneys to grapple with issues 
presented when Brady obligations are at stake.235 
Offices of prosecution should develop trainings and Continuing Legal 
Education opportunities that will assist prosecutors in their understanding of 
how to meet obligations, avoid violations, and engage in discussions about 
the ethics of reporting. These trainings can create culture shifts and allow 
for prosecutors to align ethics with practice. The Misconduct Report from 
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the National Registry of Exonerations perfectly summarizes how a 
prosecutor can wield their power to prevent Brady violations: 
A prosecutor has the power to attack official misconduct in 
criminal cases by several means. She can order her deputies not to 
. . . [conceal] exculpatory evidence . . . or direct them to follow 
protocols that make that misconduct impossible, such as open file 
discovery. She can discipline or discharge deputies who violate 
those orders . . . She can dismiss charges in cases that are tainted 
by misconduct by her own deputies or by other law enforcement 
officials . . . She can prosecute . . . any official who commits or 
procures perjury, or obstructs justice. She can reinvestigate past 
cases to see if misconduct was committed or miscarriages of 
justice occurred, and exonerate any innocent defendants she 
identifies.236 
The prosecutor can do these things if the prosecutor is empowered to do so. 
Creating a direct line between the proposed Commission on Prosecutorial 
Conduct and professional development opportunities will incentivize new 
prosecutors to meet their own Brady obligations. Prosecutors who 
coordinate with the Commission for teaching and training opportunities will 
come to understand the role the Commission can play in their work—who 
they can turn to if they need to make a report and who they may face if they 
become the subject of a complaint. 
Teaching and training costs at the law school level will be fairly low if 
they are integrated into already existing classes and supported by way of 
student clubs and organizations. Costs in early professional development 
should be appropriated from the (eventual) cost savings based on 
prosecuting the right person, the first time. For reasons of legal ethics, it can 
be assumed that Commission appointees will fill non-salaried positions, so 
if the training and teaching components are included as part of their duties, 
costs will remain quite low for law school and county prosecutor offices. If 
further funds are needed to support these programs, perhaps the Innocence 
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Projects and the National Registry of Exonerations can develop grant 
opportunities. After all, the work of organizations like these becomes easier 
if there are fewer Brady violations, and therefore fewer wrongful 
convictions, within the criminal justice system. 
VI. CRITIQUES AND RESPONSES 
Currently, there is no definitive roadmap to developing and 
implementing accountability mechanisms for prosecutorial misconduct. As 
discussed in Section IV, most possible mechanisms are underutilized or 
unenforced.237 In looking at models for guidance, the best example lies 
within New York state’s Senate Bill S2412D legislation.238 There are many 
aspects to the New York model that can inform Washington state’s work to 
develop a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. Perhaps even more 
important than a legislative review is the need to understand criticisms of 
the New York legislation. Immediately upon the passage of Senate Bill 
S2412D, it was met with legal challenges from groups of prosecutors who 
claimed their immunity was challenged.239 According to a lead 
representative for the District Attorneys Association of New York 
(DAASNY), the organization offered to engage in legislation drafting with 
state legislators but the request was not entertained by them.240 Instead, an 
amended version of the bill was revealed—allegedly without providing for 
corrections to the constitutional issues that DAASNY had noted throughout 
the drafting of the legislation.241 Seven distinct arguments are included in 
the complaint,242 many of which should inform how Washington state drafts 
its own legislation for a Commission. 
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The complaint filed on behalf of DAASNY challenges the legislature’s 
interference with the core functions of the District Attorney’s Office, which 
is established by the New York State Constitution.243 The complaint also 
alleges a violation of the separation of powers doctrine within the New 
York State Constitution.244 The complaint alleges that the appointment of 
commission members from multiple branches of state government would 
result in cross branch discipline for prosecuting attorneys, who are 
considered part of the executive branch.245 The Association has argued that 
prosecutors will be less likely to pursue difficult cases while acting with the 
knowledge that they can be scrutinized by a commission that receives 
appointments from all branches of government.246 The complaint also raises 
Due Process and Equal Protection violations,247 and alleges that the bill did 
not name standards by which the Commission will make decisions on the 
 
Article 15-A is riddled with fatal constitutional defects, as the Governor and 
State Attorney General’s Office have both concluded. Specifically, the statute: 
(1) impermissibly interferes with the constitutionally protected independence 
and core functions of elected District Attorneys by granting the CPC general 
oversight and disciplinary authority over the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion; (2) violates basic separation-of-powers principles by vesting 
oversight of an executive function in a hybrid disciplinary body, most of 
whose members are appointed by the Legislature, and by authorizing the Court 
of Appeals to suspend District Attorneys; (3) impermissibly expands the 
powers and jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge; (4) 
unlawfully compels judges to perform non-judicial tasks; (5) impermissibly 
intrudes upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Appellate Division over matters 
of attorney discipline; (6) unlawfully subjects prosecutors to discipline without 
any governing standards, in contravention of their due process and equal 
protection rights; and (7) impermissibly creates a commission with 
administrative and executive duties that operates outside the clear confines of 
the Constitution’s civil department system. 
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initiation of investigations, the sustaining of complaints, and the 
determination of disciplinary sanctions.248 
Within the complaints described above, the constitutional issues raised 
by DAASNY allege an imbalance of power that will leave prosecutors 
vulnerable and disempower them from doing their jobs.249 However, in the 
current legislation, nearly every appointed panel member will come from 
the legal community, with more than half of the appointees creating a 
balance of seasoned prosecutors and defense attorneys.250 Further 
amendments, which would have placed more appointment power with the 
governor, and hence within the executive branch, did not move forward.251 
Since the filing of these complaints, several opposing parties have also 
filed briefs, in part to counter arguments made within the initial 
complaint.252 Among them are groups who feel a Commission is needed to 
hold prosecutors who engage in misconduct accountable for their actions.253 
The Innocence Project, a national organization that works to exonerate 
wrongfully convicted individuals, filed briefs on behalf of several men in 
New York who have been wrongfully convicted.254 The Innocence Project 
argues that a lack of oversight for prosecutorial conduct has very 
consequential outcomes for innocent individuals.255 Governor Cuomo of 
New York knowingly signed into law legislation that he admitted was rife 
with legal challenges, naming the importance of moving forward this 
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initiative.256 He agreed not to activate the Commission until these legal 
challenges are resolved.257 
In January 2020, a New York Supreme Court justice ruled the 
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct unconstitutional.258 This was 
considered a win for DAASNY and places the proposed Commission at risk 
of failure. That said, illuminating why the legislation faces legal challenges, 
and what arguments are presented on both sides of the legal challenges, 
allows for Washington state to build stronger legislation with fewer 
opportunities for constitutional legal challenges. Washington state should 
learn from the criticism of how the New York bill was drafted and work to 
call upon prosecutors’ organizations and prosecutors’ offices in various 
municipalities across the state to help draft the bill that will enact the 
Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. If a collaborative approach is taken 
to ensure the Commission does not impede on prosecutors’ duties and their 
own constitutional rights, it may prevent immediate legal challenges as the 
process moves forward. Learning from New York’s challenges is one way 
to clear a path for Washington state. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The culture of non-disclosure and Brady violations in criminal 
proceedings create a myriad of negative impacts for society including 
wrongful convictions and taxpayer burden. Presently, there are no highly 
successful, or even slightly successful, avenues for accountability. A 
common law misnomer that is unsupported by history has resulted in 
immunity for prosecutors, essentially barring individuals from civil remedy. 
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for committing a Brady violation.259 Professional standards seemingly have 
no teeth, and there have been no federal or state mandates across the board 
to provide accountability mechanisms. New York state has started to forge 
a model, passing a bill to enact a Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. 
The New York bill may or may not survive the current legal challenges and 
the recent New York Supreme Court holding celebrated by prosecutors, 
who feel, generally, that their own constitutional rights are being trampled 
upon. As a model, New York offers helpful guidance, and also several large 
hurdles to overcome. 
Washington state can use the New York model to legislate and 
implement its own Commission on Prosecutorial Conduct. The Commission 
can process, track, evaluate, and offer findings on complaints of 
prosecutorial misconduct, as well as make recommendations to the 
Washington State Supreme Court in regard to sanctions. Further, the 
Commission can collaborate with county prosecutors’ offices and with law 
schools, institutions with demonstrated gaps in ethics teaching and 
trainings. 
Washington state can influence prosecutorial conduct by way of these 
three distinct touch points. We can work to reduce the systematic and 
heartbreaking ramifications that result from Brady violations. We can teach 
ethics. We can teach procedure to meet obligation. We can hold individuals 
accountable when they act in ways that inappropriately strip other 
individuals of their freedom. As we do, we will move away from the current 
practice of shielding prosecutors from accountability. We will stop allowing 
the home team to call their own balls and strikes. 
A reduction in the occurrence of Brady violations will result in fewer 
wrongful convictions, less trauma for victims and their families, and less 
waste of taxpayer money. In the end, we need to teach attorneys how to do 
the right thing and hold them accountable when they do not meet their 
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obligations. When we do, society will benefit. At its core, is that not what 
we hope systems of justice will achieve in the first place? When these 
systems meet that achievement, justice is done its citizens in the courts, and 
the United States truly wins its point.260 
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